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Abstract
This paper surveys selectively several contributions to the understanding of how cooperatives
may cope with the interplay between meritocracy and e¢ ciency when public decisions are taking
by voting and the supply of labor is freely decided by each member. This outlines the main trade-
o¤ faced by cooperatives. In particular, the degree of meritocracy is limited by three factors. 1)
E¢ ciency because too much meritocracy encourages too much work from the socially optimal
point of view). 2) Meritocracy encourages sabotage. 3) Voting because workers may prefer
ine¢ cient reward schemes as long as they are individually pro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1. Introduction
Mainstream economic theory assumes that rms are own by shareholders who are interested in
maximizing prots.1 This covers a fair amount of ground but it leaves outside cooperative produc-
tion in which a group of people (say, workers) owns a production facility (a technology, a plot of
land) and a certain input (labor) which has alternative uses (another facility, leisure,...). Inputs
and technology produce output. The reader may think of a cooperative owning a at and using
labour to produce teaching services.2
The theory of cooperative production, that we will survey selectively in this paper, assumes that
the owners of the production facility satisfy all the customary assumptions of neoclassical economics:
they have preferences over consumption and leisure that are representable by a (di¤erentiable,
increasing and concave) utility function and, when time comes, they maximize as relentlessly as
they do their peers in mainstream models. Technology will be represented by a production function
and the cooperative cannot inuence the price of the good they sell. Thus, it will come to no surprise
that many of the problems associated with capitalism resurface in this framework: Sabotage, static
and dynamic ine¢ ciencies, wrong incentives, even unemployment and exploitation! So what is new
here?
What is new is twofold. On the one hand, we have to determine how surplus is distributed.
In the standard model, prots are distributed according to exogenously given proportions. On
the other hand, having removed the assumption of prot maximizing rms, we have to describe a
criterion to choose among production plans. Let us consider these two issues in turn.
Distributional issues are dealt with the concept of a Sharing Rule (Sen (1966), Moulin (1987),
Roemer and Silvestre (1993)). This is a function mapping e¤ort, labor or any contribution made
by each worker into the share of the output of each worker. For instance we may give every worker
the same share, irrespective of their contributions. This is the Egalitarian sharing rule. Or we
may equal this share to the share of her e¤ort with respect to total e¤ort. This is the Proportional
sharing rule. Or we might combine both. As we will see, there is a host of sharing rules and,
unless additional reasons are supplied, there is no particular reason to prefer one to another. This
1Despite the fact that prot maximization agrees exactly with shareholders interests only in special cases, like
large economies, see Hart (1979).
2 In fact the work of Roemer and Silvestre on this topic was motivated by their membership to a wine cooperative
in Davis.
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implies two things: One, that theorems which hold for general sharing rules are preferable to those
in which a particular form is postulated. Two, that when using a particular rule, we must supply
reasons why this rule is chosen. As we will see, e¢ ciency and majority voting are two of such
requirements. Axiomatics is another. Kang (1988) showed that for more than two workers, the
convex combination of the egalitarian and the proportional sharing rules is the unique di¤erentiable
sharing rule which is symmetric and homogeneous of degree zero (i.e. independent of the units in
which the input is measured).3 Some of the results surveyed in this paper will use this functional
form.
The rst papers on cooperative production assumed that wage maximization was a reasonable
goal, see Ward (1958) and Vanek (1970). But this goal was too extreme in the sense that gave no
value to leisure, only consumption.4 A more reasonable goal would be that, given a sharing rule, the
production plan should be Pareto E¢ cient inside the coop (Roemer and Silvestre (1993)). Next issue
is the non cooperative implementation of such solutions. Sen (1966) proposed a Nash equilibrium
in which each worker is free of supplying whatever amount of labor she wants, i.e. a Contribution
Mechanism. He proved that equilibrium and e¢ ciency are simultaneously attained by setting the
weight of the proportional sharing rule equal to the elasticity of output with respect to labor. The
intuition is that, an egalitarian sharing rule gives incentives to work very little. But meritocracy
gives incentives to work more than it is socially e¢ cient because an increase in work, not only
means more output, it also means that the share of the labour of the person making an extra e¤ort
increases. Unfortunately this result only holds when all workers are identical (Beviá and Corchón
(2009) and Moulin (2010)). When they are not, the production function must be polynomial of
degree at most n  1 where n is the number of workers in the cooperative. We present a simplied
version of this result. The sharing rule compatible with e¢ ciency is the Incremental Sharing Rule.5
Recall that a result, due to Weierestrass, states that every continuous function dened on a closed
interval [a; b] can be uniformly approximated as closely as desired by a polynomial function. Thus,
when n is large and the production function is continuous, a polynomial production function is
3Moulin (1987) provided an alternative axiomatization of this sharing rule.
4This goal also produced weird comparative static results like an increase in demand decreases total output, see
Ward (1958) for details.
5This rule has two parts. One part awards each agent with her marginal product as in the Vickrey-Clark-Groves
mechanisms. The other part depend on the contributions of other agents. These terms are chosen such that when
the production function is polynomial, the incremental sharing rule delivers as much consumption as output.
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indeed a good approximation. When it is not, implementation theory (see e.g. Corchón (2017) for
a survey) is called to the rescue! Recall that implementation provides tools to analyze decentralized
solutions.6 In fact Corchón and Puy (2002) showed that for any sharing rule, there is a mechanism
whose Nash equilibria yield allocations in the sharing rule that are Pareto e¢ cient for a large set of
preferences.7 This result appears to imply that, provided that the right mechanism is used, there
is no conict between e¢ ciency and distribution. In other word, even if the sharing rule does not
encourage work, a mechanism can be designed to overcome the rational laziness of agents.
However implementation theory assumes that all actions are controlled by the mechanism.
When this strong assumption is lifted, sabotage raise its ugly face. As far as we know Nalebu¤
and Stiglitz (1983) were the rst to acknowledge that In the competitive system.... there are...
rewards from engaging in destructive activity(id. p. 40). In the case of a capitalistic rm, Lazear
(1989) pointed out that large di¤erences in salaries encouraged sabotage. Beviá and Corchón
(2006) study sabotage under cooperative production and showed that when the possibilities of
destruction by sabotage are small in relation to the number of agents, all sharing rules satisfying
two mild conditions yield a Nash equilibrium with no sabotage. However, when the possibilities of
destruction are not small, the degree of meritocracy that is compatible with the absence of sabotage
depends negatively on the degrees of congestion and substitutability among the inputs provided by
workers. In any case, the egalitarian sharing rule is safe from sabotage 8
Having studied how allocative e¢ ciency and sabotage might be used to shrink the set of rea-
sonable sharing rules we now turn our attention to voting. We are motivated by the fact that
many decisions in real cooperatives are taken by voting, sometimes delegating the decision in a
democratically chosen Board of Directors (BOD). In this case we assume that there is a function
mapping any possible composition of the BOD into the set of sharing rules.9 Assuming quasi-linear
utilities, Corchón and Puy (1998) showed that, to guarantee individual rationality, the weight given
to egalitarian sharing rule must be zero. They also showed that under additional conditions, utility
6 Implementation theory looks for means of transmitting the information in the hands of agents such that the game
induced among the agents yields the desired outcome when agents behave strategically.
7They also show that under "classical" conditions these allocations exist.
8This might help to explain why cooperatives tend to o¤er egalitarian incentive schemes (Kremer [1997]).
9This procedure assumes that the decisions of the BOD can be modeled in a convenient black box without inquiring
about the methods used by the BOD to achieve decisions. See Reynolds (2000) for a discussion of some of these
methods, which include voting.
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is single peaked in the weight of the proportional sharing rule. Thus, the peak of the median voter
determines the sharing rule. It turns out that in this case, this peak is located in the extreme
(i.e. either the proportional rule gets zero weight or the whole weight).10 Later on, Torregrosa-
Montaner (2017) explored the case when a continuum of voters have Cobb-Douglas preferences and
agents di¤er in their wealth endowments. He nds that when wealth distribution exhibits positive
(negative) skew, the degree of meritocracy chosen by individuals is lower (higher) than that of the
optimum, and coincides with it when the distribution is symmetric. Moreover, e¢ ciency is also
reached for extreme levels of returns to scale.
Barberá, Beviá and Ponsati (2015) presented a model of coalition formation where workers
choose their reward schemes by majority. This create instability in the organizations in some cases.
They also show that, when stable organizational structures exist, coalitions with proportional
or egalitarian sharing rules may coexist and the coalitions that are formed are not necessarily
segregated.
The literature considered so far, focus in a static cooperative where entry and exit of new and
old members and the capital stock are exogenously given. We take these two issues in turn.
Corchón (2005) presented a model of entry and exit in an overlapping generations model in
which agents with High (H) and Low (L) productivity are free to enter into the cooperative and
live for two periods. In the rst period, agents perform a task for which all agents are equally
capable. At the beginning of the second period, one of them is (randomly) chosen to be the
boss. Other agents might leave the organization if they wish. If the boss is H, she has a positive
externality on all other agents. When this externality is large, in a dynamic equilibrium, no matter
how likely is that the boss will be H, both classes of workers coexist. The explanation of this
fact is that when the externality is large, L workers receive a large externality from a H boss so
they have incentives to enter. This is the Umbrella E¤ect.11 He also shows that the quality of the
members of the organization may change cyclically. Beviá, Corchón and Romero-Medina (2016)
introduce Medium productivity workers (M) and, instead free entry, incumbent members can choose
10 In this case the proportional rule is mixed with the Equal Benet Rule dened below !!!!!
11This e¤ect provides an explanation to the casual observation that some intelligent leaders are surrounded by
mediocre people. The usual explanation of this fact is that, intelligent people do not like to be surrounded by
potential challengers. Without denying that this may be the case in some instances, the umbrella e¤ect provides an
alternative explanation: Intelligent bosses provide an umbrella under which the mediocre prosper.
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by plurality voting whom to hire and how to share output. They show that in some cases, L agents
may yield political power (i.e. majority) to M agents even if they value the future highly. This
is what they call the Relinquish E¤ect. They also show that H agents may receive less than their
individual output, i.e. they are exploited and they may be not hired because their entrance may
threaten the dominance of the dominant class. They call this Political Unemployment.
Lastly we consider accumulation of human capital (e.g. schooling). The investment in human
capital has two e¤ects. A direct e¤ect for the agents investing and an indirect e¤ect for their
descendants. Beviá and Corchón (2017) assume that agents are identical and produce their own
capital using the inherited capital and labor. Output is produced by capital alone and is distributed
according to a weighted average of the proportional and the egalitarian sharing rules. Suppose rst
that agents do not care about future generations. Under Cobb-Douglas preferences (i.e. when the
elasticity of substitution equals to one) capital grows at a constant rate. This rate depends positively
on the taste of consumption and the degree of meritocracy because both encourage e¤ort which in
turn produces more capital. For any other value of the elasticity of substitution, there is a steady
state value of capital.12 When they consider a set up in which workers maximize a discounted sum
of utilities they have to assume that preferences are Cobb-Douglas. They show that when future
generations do not count much, there is a solution to the intertemporal maximization problem in
which the growth rate is constant and larger than the corresponding rate in the zero discounting
case. This is due to the fact that when future counts, there are more incentives to invest in capital
which in turn stimulates growth. In both cases, meritocracy encourages work which produces
human capital, which makes the economy grow. But this does not imply that quick growth is good
for social welfare because, possibly, this is achieved at cost of very hard labor. Surprisingly, they
prove that Sens result (1966) resurfaces here: dynamic e¢ ciency is achieved when the weight of
the proportional sharing rule equals the elasticity of output with respect to capital.
A running topic throughout this paper is the compatibility of meritocracy, e¢ ciency, incentives
to work and voting on income allocation inside the cooperative. While e¢ ciency, incentives and
voting are easily identied, the denition of meritocracy is not obvious. Standard denitions of
meritocracy stress ability or talent. We think otherwise. Merit should be tied to actions not to
12When the elasticity of substitution is smaller than one (i.e. consumption and leisure are complements), the
steady state is stable, i.e. growth eventually disappears. But if the elasticity of substitution is larger than one (i.e.
consumption and leisure are substitutes), the steady state is unstable, so unbounded growth is now possible.
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types. In particular to the labor spent in the cooperative. We regard the proportional sharing
rule as meritocratic because it yields a proportion of consumption (relative reward) equal to the
proportion of labor spent (relative merit).
2. A Static Model of a Cooperative
In this section we describe the main ingredients of our static analysis. Most of our concepts and
assumptions are borrowed from standard economic theory.
There are n workers that supply labor denoted by li, i 2 N = f1; 2; ::::ng. Let l  (l1; l2; :::; ln);
l i  (l1; :::; li 1; li+1; :::; ln); L 
Pn
j=1 lj . There is a maximum quantity of labor that any worker
can supply, l.
Agents share a technology represented by a production function X : Rn+ ! R+: The function
X is assumed to be concave, increasing and di¤erentiable in [0; l]n with X(0) = 0:
Let xi be the consumption of i and x  (x1; x2; :::; xn). The pair (x; l) is an allocation. An
allocation (x; l) is feasible if
Pn
i=1 xi  X(l) and li 2 [0; l]; i 2 N . The set of feasible allocations is
denoted by A.
Each worker i has preferences over consumption and labor representable by a concave and
di¤erentiable utility function Ui = Ui(xi; li) which is strictly increasing in the rst argument and
strictly decreasing in the second argument. An economy is dened as a list of utility functions,
U  (U1; U2; ::::; Un); satisfying the assumptions listed above. Let E be the set of all admissible
economies.
The Pareto e¢ cient solution, 'E : E ! A associates to each economy in the domain the set of
Pareto e¢ cient allocations for this economy.
These allocations are found by
max
nX
i=1
iUi(xi; li) with (x; l) 2 A
for given (1; 2; :::; n)   such that i  0 and
Pn
i=1 i = 1. This is the maximization of a
continuous function over a compact set and, hence, it has a solution by Weierestrass theorem. The
program is concave and thus rst order conditions give us the maximum. Assuming interiority, and
denoting by  the Lagrange multiplier associated with the balance constraint, we have that
i
@Ui(xi; li)
@xi
=  and i
@Ui(xi; li)
@li
=  @X(l)
@li
8i 2 N: Thus,
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 @Ui(xi;li)@li
@Ui(xi;li)
@xi
=
@X(l)
@li
; i 2 N: (2.1)
Equation (2.1) says that the marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption equals the
marginal productivity of labor (which in our case is the marginal rate of transformation between
labor and consumption). If labor is homogeneous, marginal productivities are identical so (2.1)
implies the equalization of marginal rates of substitution between any pair of agents (a condition
reminiscent of an exchange economy).
A Sharing Rule species the consumption allocated to each worker as a function of labor inputs.
Formally, a sharing rule, x; is a collection of di¤erentiable functions (x1;x2; ::::;xn) with xi : Rn+ !
R+, i 2 N; such that
Pn
j=1 xj(l) = X(l), 8l 2 [0; l]n. Well-known examples of sharing rules are:
xPi (l) =
li
L
X(l); for all i 2 N (Proportional)
xEi (l) =
1
n
X(l); for all i 2 N (Equal Sharing)
xi (l) = 
li
L
X(l) + (1  ) 1
n
X(l);  2 [0; 1]; i 2 N:
The family of sharing rules x is parametrized by : If  = 0, x is the egalitarian sharing rule
and if  = 1; x is the proportional sharing rule. The parameter  is a measure of how relative
e¤ort is valued and thus measures the degree of meritocracy which play an important role in our
analysis. Another interested sharing rule is the Equal Benet rule, in which each worker consumes
according to her budget constraint of the Walrasian equilibrium with equal distribution of prots,
Formally,
xEBi (l) =
@X(l)
@li
li +
1
n
(X(l) 
nX
j=1
@X(l)
@lj
lj); i 2 N (Equal Benet)
The interested reader can nd in Moulin (1987) and Pngsten (1991) other examples of sharing
rules.
An e¢ cient sharing rule, denoted as 'xE ; selects e¢ cient allocations whose consumption allo-
cated to each worker is determined by the sharing rule x, formally:
'xE(U) = f(x; l) 2 'E(U) j xi = xi(l); for all i 2 Ng
Corchón and Puy (2002) proved that 'xE(U) is not empty whenever the sharing rule x is
continuous. The proof is inspired by the proof of Negishi (1960) of the existence of a Walrasian
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Equilibrium. The sharing rules described above are all continuous, and hence, e¢ cient sharing
rules. This implies that any continuous sharing rule deemed as meritocratic, is compatible with
e¢ ciency since there are Pareto e¢ cient allocations that belong to this rule.
3. E¢ ciency, Meritocracy and Incentives in a Static Model
We now turn our attention to the non-cooperative part of the problem. If labor contributions are
voluntary, we have a game in which the strategy space for each worker is [0; l] and agents receive the
share of the total production dictated by a sharing rule, xi = xi(l) and x(l) = (x1(l);x2(l); :::;xn(l)).
We refer to this game as the contribution game. Payo¤ functions are Ui(xi(l); li); i 2 N: A Nash
equilibrium of this game in normal form is a vector of strategies, l; such that
Ui(xi(l
); li )  Ui(xi(l1; ::; li; ::; ln); li) for all li 2 [0; l], for all i 2 N:
First order conditions of an interior Nash equilibrium are
@Ui(xi; li)
@xi
@xi(l)
@li
+
@Ui(xi; li)
@li
= 0; or
 @Ui(xi;li)@li
@Ui(xi;li)
@xi
=
@xi(l)
@li
(3.1)
Comparing equations (2.1) and (3.1) we see that, in general, Nash equilibria are not Pareto e¢ cient
unless
@X(l)
@li
=
@xi(l)
@li
:
Assume that (i) all agents are identical; (ii) the sharing rule is a convex combination of the propor-
tional and the equal share sharing rules, x(l); and (iii) the production function is of CES form,
X(l) = (
Pn
i=1 l

i )
r
 with   1 and 0  r  1, we have the following result.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (i), (ii) and (iii), any Nash equilibrium of the contribution
game yields e¢ cient allocations if and only if  = r.
Proof. First, under assumption (i), any Nash equilibrium, l; is symmetric. Which implies
that xi(l) = (1=n)X(l): Furthermore, under assumption (ii),
@xi(l
)
@li
=
(n  1)
n2li
X(l) +
1
n
@X(l)
@li
:
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Thus, @X(l)=@li = @xi(l)=@li if and only if
@X(l)
@li
(n  1)
n
=
(n  1)
n2li
X(l):
Or equivalently, if and only if,
@X(l)
@li
li
X(l)
=

n
:
Which under the assumption (iii) on the production function implies  = r: Since second order
conditions hold, any Pareto e¢ cient Nash equilibrium implies r = . Conversely if r =  rst order
condition of e¢ ciency and equilibrium coincide and since second order conditions hold, the result
follows.
Sen (1966) proved a special case of this proposition when the product is homogeneous.
The intuitive reason why the sharing rule x(l) works is that  measures the degree of respon-
siveness of production to inputs. The equalitarian sharing rule does not encourage e¤ort as much
as the proportional does because in the former the marginal return of e¤ort is less than under the
proportional rule. Thus, when output is not very responsive to e¤orts, to apply the proportional
rule is not a good idea. But when output is very responsive to labor, e¢ ciency requires a lot of
work and to apply the proportional rule is a good idea. The question is whether this result is
generalizable to economies where agents are di¤erent. Suppose rst that there are a large number
of workers and X(L) = (L)r with r  1: In this case it is reasonable to assume that an individual,
when taking her decision about her labor contribution, considers that the impact of this decision
on total labor contribution is insignicant. Thus,
@xi(l
)
@li
= Lr
1
L
:
Since for X(L) = Lr we have that @X(l)=@li = rLr 1; Nash equilibrium is compatible with
e¢ ciency if and only if r = :
The previous results are valid when workers are identical or the cooperative is large. When
none of these two assumptions hold, Browning (1983) showed that the contribution mechanism de-
scribed by Sen achieves e¢ ciency only when the production function fullls a separability property.
Beviá and Corchón (2009) showed that when product is homogeneous, the contribution mechanism
achieves e¢ ciency only when the production function is a polynomial of, at most, degree n 1. We
o¤er in this survey the analysis with two agents to give a avor of the general result. We introduce
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some useful notation in what follows. Let
R = fl j 9U 2 E ; (x(l); l) 2 'E(U)g:
R is the set of input allocations that, given a sharing rule x, yield e¢ cient allocations for some
economy. We refer to l as an e¢ cient input allocation. Dene,
Ri(lj) = fli j 9U 2 E ; (x(li; lj); (li; lj)) 2 'E(U)g:
Ri(lj) is the set of input contributions for i, li; such that (li; lj) is an e¢ cient input allocation for
some economy. Under the assumptions on the set of admissible economies, Ri(lj) is the interval
[0; l]; and 8l 2 [0; l]n;9U 2 E such that l is the unique e¢ cient input allocation for U .
With this notation in hand, we can establish the following result which generalization for N =
f1; :::; ng can be found in Beviá and Corchón (2009).
Proposition 2. Suppose N = f1; 2g. If Nash equilibrium of the contribution mechanism yields
e¢ cient allocations in any U 2 E , the production function displays constant returns to scale.
Proof. Take any U 2 E and consider a Pareto e¢ cient allocation (x(l); l) such that l is a
Nash equilibrium. Thus,
@xi(l
)
@li
=
dX(li + l

j )
dL
; 8i 2 N .
The above equation holds in the interval Ri(l i): Integrating on [0; li] we get
xi(li; l

j ) = X(li + l

j ) Qi, 8li 2 Ri(lj ); 8i 2 N ,
where Qi depends on lj : Since the above equation holds for all lj 2 Rj(li); 8j 6= i;
xi(li; lj)  X(li + lj) Qi(lj); 8(li; lj) 2 R; 8i 2 N . (3.2)
Adding over i and considering feasibility we obtain
X(li + lj)  Qi(lj) +Qj(li); 8l 2 R: (3.3)
(see Browning (1983)). Consider now the vectors (li; 0); (0; lj); and (0; 0): Since X(0 + 0) = 0;
Qi(0) +Qj(0) = 0; and using (3.3)
X(li + lj) X(li) X(lj) = 0 (3.4)
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The solution of (3.4) is a polynomial of, at most, degree 1 (Aczel (1966) pp. 129-130). Thus, the
production function display constant returns to scale.
When N = f1; 2g; to distribute the total output in a way that each worker receives her marginal
contribution to the total production represents a sharing rule whenever the production function
has constant returns to scale. Formally, this sharing rule is dened as
xi(l) = X(li + lj) X(lj):
We refer to x as the Incremental Sharing Rule.
Proposition Let N = f1; 2g and suppose that the production function, X; displays constant
returns to scale. All Nash equilibria associated with an anonymous sharing rule are e¢ cient if and
only if the sharing rule is the incremental sharing rule.
Proof. Suppose that Nash equilibrium are e¢ cient. By anonymity and feasibility, xi(0; 0) =
xj(0; 0) = 0: As we have shown in Proposition 2, the sharing rule should satisfy (3.2), which together
with anonymity implies that Qi(0) = Qj(0) = 0: Given l = (li; lj); by (3.3), X(lj) = Qi(lj);
therefore xi(li; lj) = X(li + lj)   X(lj): Thus, the sharing rule is the incremental sharing rule.
Finally, notice that the allocation yielded by Nash equilibrium of the contribution game associated
to the incremental sharing rue is e¢ cient because the incremental sharing rule equalizes social and
private gains.
The previous result may look like negative but this is only because we assume 2 workers only.
Beviá and Corchón (2009) proved the previous result for arbitrary n. And in this case, the produc-
tion function must be a polynomial of at most degree n  1. Given that any continuous function in
a compact interval can be approximated by a polynomial this suggest that the incremental sharing
rule implements, approximately, an e¢ cient solution when the number of workers is high. For
N = f1; :::; ng; this rules is dened as
xIi (l) = X(L)  (n  1)X(L i)+
n  1
2
X
k 6=i
X(L ik)  n  1
3
X
k;h 6=i
X(L ikh)+ ::+( 1)n 1
X
j 6=i
X(lj)
where L i 
P
j 6=i lj , L ik =
P
j 6=i;j 6=k lj ; L ikm =
P
j 6=i;j 6=k;j 6=m lj and so on. The sharing rule is
well dene whenever X is a polynomial of at most degree n  1:
Note that
xIi (l)  xIi (0; l i) = X(L) X(L i):
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This rule has two parts. One part awards each worker with her marginal product as it happens
with the celebrated Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanisms. The other part is composed by
terms that depend on the contributions of other agents. Despite the complex analytical formthe
Incremental Sharing Rule is quite simple. It demands the equalization between private gain in
consumption of i and public gain in aggregate output for each variation of the labor supplied by
i.13
When the assumption that the production function is polynomial is not a reasonable approxi-
mation, we have to rely on the full force of implementation theory. In this framework, each worker
has a message space indicating the kind of communication that she is allowed to make. For each
prole of messages there is an outcome. The planner enforces allocations but she does not know
the preferences of agents. Corchón and Puy (2002) provided a simple mechanism that, when there
are at least three workers, implements in Nash equilibrium every e¢ cient sharing rule.14 This
means that every message that constitutes a Nash equilibrium yields the desired allocations and
that the set of Nash equilibria is not empty. In their mechanism, people are arranged in a circle
and each worker proposes the amount of input supplied by him and the worker next to him. Here
we reproduce verbally how the mechanism works. For the technical details see Corchón and Puy
(2002) Theorem 2. The mechanism has three rules:
1. When the amount of input proposed by each worker coincides with the amount suggested by
her monitor, the mechanism distributes the output according to the sharing rule.
2. When there are, at most, two consecutive workers whose proposals di¤er from what was proposed
for them, the worker with the lowest index (the dissident) has the right to choose an allocation in
a certain budget set that is only protable if she has deviated from a non e¢ cient allocation. Since
a deviation can only happen if the monitor of the dissident has tried to fool the mechanism, the
monitor of this worker is severely ned: she gets zero consumption and has to contribute with the
maximum amount of labor. All other workers obtain some arbitrary bundle.
3. For any other message, the mechanism divides workers into two groups: the ones that consume
13Moulin (2010) provided a similar characterization of the incremental sharing rule (the residual mechanism as
Moulin called it) in the context of cost sharing. Formally, one result does not imply the other or viceversa because
the two games are not the same. In Beviá and Corchón (2009), the game is a contribution game associated to an
output sharing problem and in Moulins case it is a demand game associated to a cost-sharing game. Leroux (2008)
has proved that these two games are di¤erent.
14All the previos contributions focused on the implementation of a single sharing rule, see Corchón and Puy (2002).
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but do not work, and the ones that work but do not consume. Clearly to announce an e¢ cient
allocation proposed by the sharing rule is a Nash equilibrium, because deviations can only punish
the deviator. And any Nash equilibrium yields the desired allocations because if it occurs in the
rst case a deviator can obtain a larger utility by deviating and there is no equilibrium in the
second and the third case since there is always a worker who can deviate and improve her payo¤.
Clearly to announce the contributions that are e¢ cient is an equilibrium. The converse, i.e. to
prove that all Nash equilibria yield the desired allocation is harder, see Corchón and Puy (2002)
for details.
3.1. Sabotage
In this section we broaden the scope of incentive theory by considering situations in which agents
can sabotage production by destroying other agentsinputs. The input supplied by a worker reects
now her e¤ort and the sabotage done by others on this worker. In Beviá and Corchón (2006) is
assumed that sabotage is undetectable because the e¤ort and the technology of sabotage are not
contractible. They show that sabotage might arise in the framework of cooperative production, in
which the output is entirely distributed to workers.
In order to formally analyze the possibilities of sabotage, we introduce some basic notation and
small modications in the cooperative production model described in the previous section. We focus
in the survey on an specic case with identical agents, with a CES production function and the
family of sharing rules generated as a convex combination of the proportional and the egalitarian
one. The analysis of a more general case can be found in Beviá and Corchón (2006).
The quantity of labor time that each worker can supply is xed and equal to T: An worker i
can divide her working time between productive labor, lPi ; and sabotage activities. Let lij be the
quantity of labor allocated by i to sabotage the input of worker j. Thus, T = lPi +
P
j 6=i lij : The
input provided by worker i; Ii; depends on her own productive e¤ort, lPi ; and the amount of time
devoted by the remaining agents to sabotaging the input of i; i.e. Ii = I(lPi ; l1i; :::l(i 1)i; l(i+1)i; :::lni)
where I( ) is a C1 function such that
@I(lPi ; l1i; :::l(i 1)i; l(i+1)i; :::lni)
@lPi
> 0 and
@I(lPi ; l1i; :::l(i 1)i; l(i+1)i; :::lni)
@lji
< 0 for all lji
Suppose a constant elasticity of substitution production function, X(I1; :::; In) = (
Pn
i=1(Ii)
)
r
 with
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  1 and r  1: The sharing rule is x that now depends on inputs, that is,
xi (I1; ::In) = (
IiPn
j=1 Ij
+ (1  ) 1
n
)X(I1; :::; In):
The sabotage game is described as follows: for each worker i, a strategy is the time devoted to
sabotage activities, i.e. the vector li = (li1; ::; li(i 1); li(i+1); ::; lin): Time devoted to productive
activities is determined by the constraint lPi = T  
P
j 6=i lij : For each worker i; given a vector of
strategies (li; l i); the payo¤ function is given by
i(li; l i)  xi (I1; ::In) where
Ij(li; l i)  I(T  
X
j 6=i
lji; l1j ; :::l(j 1)j ; l(j+1)j ; :::lnj); j 2 N
A Nash equilibrium of the sabotage game, denoted by NE, is a vector of strategies (l1; ::; ln) such
that for all worker i; i(li; l i)  i(l0i; l i) for all l0i:
Beviá and Corchón (2006) established the conditions under which the existence of a Nash
equilibrium is guarantee. In this survey we concentrate on the necessary conditions that guarantee
that there is no sabotage in equilibrium under the above specications.
Let
M   
@Ij(0;0)
@lij
@Ii(0;0)
@lPi
:
M is a measure of the relative impact of change in inputs induced by a re-allocation of labor time
of i from productive activities to sabotage activities evaluated at the point of zero sabotage. Thus,
M is a measure of the power of destruction versus production capabilities. Abusing language, we
will say that M is a measure of the possibilities of destruction. From our assumptions it follows
that M > 0: Furthermore, because of our symmetry assumption on the input functions, M is
independent of i and j:
With this notation in hand, we can give the following result:
Proposition 3. If zero sabotage is a Nash equilibrium of the sabotage game, then (M +1 n) 
r(M + 1)(n  1).
Proof. The proof follows from the observation that if no worker has incentive to sabotage when
all other agents do not sabotage, it must be that for all i; j; @i(0; 0)=@lij  0 which, under the
assumptions imposed in this section implies that (M + 1  n)  r(M + 1)(n  1):
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The condition (M + 1   n)  r(M + 1)(n   1) always hold when the cooperative is large or
when the possibilities of destruction via sabotage (M) are small because in this case the left hand
side of the inequality is negative and the right hand side is positive. But when M + 1  n > 0 this
inequality puts an upper bound to the degree of meritocracy that is compatible with no sabotage.
In this case a small r is bad to avoid sabotage because r is an inverse measure of congestion. When
r is small, e¤orts do not translate into output easily so sabotage is tempting.
4. Voting and Cooperation in a Static Model
Many decisions in real cooperatives are taken by voting, sometimes delegating the decision in a
democratically chosen Board of Directors (BOD). In this section we analyses the class of sharing
rules that will be chosen if members of the cooperative have the right to vote on her preferable
choice. To make the problem tractable, we assume that there are an odd number of workers in the
cooperative and workers preferences are represented by a quasilinear utility function, Ui(xi; li) =
xi   vi(li); where vi is strictly increasing and strictly convex for all i 2 N: We also assume that
workers have to choose a sharing rule in the class x taking into account that her labor contribution,
given the chosen rule, has to be the e¢ cient one, that is (x(l); l) 2 'xE(U):
Given the quasilinear assumption, an e¢ cient allocation, (x^; l^); satises the following condition:
@X(l^)
@li
=
@vi(l^i)
@li
for all i 2 N: (4.1)
Since preferences are strictly convex, condition (4.1) determines a unique vector l^ which is inde-
pendent on the degree of meritocracy : The preferred  for each worker will depend on
@Ui(x

i (l^); l^i)
@
= X(l^)(
l^iPn
i=1 l^i
  1
n
): (4.2)
For all agents i such that l^i > (
Pn
i=1 l^i)=n; (4.2) is positive and therefore, their preferred level of
meritocracy is  = 1: For those agents such that l^i < (
Pn
i=1 l^i)=n; (4.2) is negative and therefore,
their preferred level of meritocracy is  = 0: Thus, the chosen sharing rule will be either  = 1 or
 = 0 depending on the labor contribution of the median voter. If it is above the average total
labor, the sharing rule will be meritocratic otherwise will be egalitarian. We summarize this result
in the following proposition.
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Proposition 4. Suppose preferences are quasilinear and workers have to choose by majority voting
a sharing rule in the class x : Let (x(l^); l^) 2 'xE(U); and let l^med the labor contribution of the
median voter. Then, if l^med  (
Pn
i=1 l^i)=n the sharing rule will be meritocratic,  = 1; otherwise
will be egalitarian,  = 0:
Note that if l^med = (
Pn
i=1 l^i)=n; the median voter is indi¤erent between any sharing rule. We
have broken ties in favor of meritocracy.
In Corchón and Puy (1998) this analysis is extended by considering the class of sharing rules
that are a convex combinations of the Proportional, the Egalitarian and the Equal Benet sharing
rules. They rst proved that if we want not only e¢ cient sharing rules but also individually rational
sharing rules (each worker gets at least her reservation value, that they suppose in their paper that
is zero), the weight of the egalitarian sharing rule has to be zero. This is because they show an
example in which e¢ ciency forces an able worker to exert hard e¤ort and to a non-able worker to
exert very little e¤ort. Given that consumption is equally shared among them, the able worker
is better o¤ by neither consuming, nor working. Having discarded egalitarianism, agents have
to choose, by majority voting, a sharing rule in the class formed by convex combinations of the
Proportional and the Equal Benet sharing rules. They prove that preferences of the agents are
single peak with the peak in the extremes, that is, either the most preferred sharing rule is the
Proportional or the Equal benet. These preferences depends for each worker (like in Proposition
4) on the comparison between i e¢ cient labor contribution and the average e¢ cient labor.15
The previous result suggest that, if there were several potential cooperatives and workers could
move freely among them, they would cluster in cooperatives with similar productivities with a
sharing rule either proportional or egalitarian. Barberá, Beviá and Ponsati (2015) take a closer
look to a situation in which the set of workers are partitioned in di¤erent cooperatives. And once
the cooperative is organized, members choose their sharing rule by majority voting among the class
of sharing rules x . They focus on the notion of Stability which requires that no group of agents
has incentives to organize a di¤erent cooperative than the one they belong in the partition. They
assume that the production function has constant returns to scale but a minimal number of workers
 are needed for the cooperative to be productive. As before, preferences are quasilinear. As we
15A result identical to Proposition 4 is obtained by replacing the Egalitarian sharing rule by the Equal Benet
sharing rule.
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will see, they show that meritocratic and egalitarian cooperatives can coexist and that stability do
not imply a segregation of groups of similar productivity.
As in Corchón and Puy (1991), the e¢ cient contribution of labor for each worker (which is
determined by (4.1)) is independent on the other agents contributions. Thus, we can describe a
cooperative by a vector of e¢ cient labor l = (l1; :::; ln): Note that since the group of agents that will
form a cooperative is endogenous, we can not make the assumption that there is an odd number
of agents. So, it could be that for some cooperatives there are several median voters. In this case
ties are broken in favor of the worker with the highest productivity. To simplify our presentation
suppose that  = N=2 and there are three type of agents: high, medium and low productive agents
i 2 fh;m; lg, with productivity lh; lm; and ll respectively, with lh > lm > ll: The sets H; M; and
L denote the sets of all high, medium and low type agents respectively and nH ; nM and nL denote
the cardinality of these sets. A class of societies that are key for the analysis of stable partitions is
the maximally mixed meritocratic societies formally dened as the class of societies (N; ; l) such
that 0 < nH < v=2; 0 < nL  v=2; and (lh + lm + nLll)=(nL + 2)  lm: In this class of societies, it
is always possible to construct a meritocratic cooperative of cardinality  with agents of all three
types. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 1. (Barberá, Beviá and Ponsatí (2015)) A society with a stable partition with non-
segregated groups where di¤erent sharing rules coexist.
Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10g ;  = 5; and l = (100; 100; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 75; 45): Let G1 =
f1; 3; 4; 5; 10g and G2 = f2; 6; 7; 8; 9g: Note that G1 will choose a meritocratic sharing rule and G2
will choose an egalitarian one. Let us see that the partition  = (G1; G2) is stable. Note that
the medium type agents in G2 can only improve if a high type is added to the coalition or if a
medium type is substituted by a high type. But since the other high type not in G2 is already
in a meritocratic coalition, she does not have incentives to form the potential blocking coalition.
The two high types cannot be together in a meritocratic coalition, and any other worker needs
high types to improve. That implies that  is a stable partition. Note that high and medium
productivity agents are split between the two coalitions.
The following result, characterize the kind of cooperatives that can be formed in equilibrium
Proposition 5. (Barberá, Beviá and Ponsatí (2015))
(a) In three type societies where v = n=2, stable partitions always exist.
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(b) If societies are maximally mixed meritocratic, stability implies non-segregation and one of the
cooperatives is meritocratic.
(c) If societies are not maximally mixed meritocratic, then the segregated partition where a coalition
of most productive agents of size v is formed, and the rest of agents gather together in a second
coalition is always stable.
Thus, contrarily to the conjecture by Corchón and Puy (1991), when workers can form and quit
cooperatives, stability could imply non segregated cooperatives populated by agents with di¤erent
productivities.
These models have several shortcomings, among them the assumption of quasi-linearity in
consumption. Torregrosa-Montaner (2017) has analyzed the case of a continuum of workers with
identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions but di¤erent endowments and X(L) = Lr. In his model,
e¤ort and consumption depend on endowments. As before, workers vote on the level of meritocracy
. He nds that low-wealthy (resp. high-wealthy) cooperatives choose degrees of meritocracy below
(resp. above) the optimal. Thus, poor (resp. rich) workers are willing to sacrice e¢ ciency for
(resp. lack of) redistribution. When the distribution of wealth is symmetric, these two forces
compensate each other and voting yields the e¢ cient value of meritocracy, namely r = .
Summing up, voting, whatever other advantages it has, does not guarantee e¢ ciency. On the
contrary, the results that we surveyed point out that voting is likely to introduce biases in the
degree of meritocracy and, when agents can form di¤erent cooperatives, in the composition and
the number of cooperatives.
5. Dynamics. Voting, Unemployment and Exploitation
So far we have consider one period models. In this section we focus attention on a cooperative in
which there is entry or exit in each period.
Beviá, Corchón and Romero (2016) have studied the dynamics of a cooperative when initial
members of the cooperative decide both, whom to invite to join and the sharing rule applied in the
cooperative among the class x . The cooperative and workers last for a countable innite number of
periods  = (0; 1; :::t; :::). In each period  ; decisions to invite and to share the output are taken by
plurality. We retain the assumptions made in the second part of Section 4: the production function
has constant returns to scale, preferences are quasilinear and each worker in the cooperative has to
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contribute with the e¢ cient labor. Following the analysis presented in the previous section, under
those assumptions we can identied an economy with a vector l: Additionally, it is assume that
there is only three type of agents, i 2 fh;m; lg, with productivity lh; lm; and ll respectively, with
lh > lm > ll: The sets H; M; and L denote the sets of high, medium and low type agents and nH ;
nM and n

L denote the cardinality of these sets at period  that includes the new hirings. Assuming
that the outside option of any worker is su¢ ciently low, all agents invited to join accept and no
one wants to leave the cooperative. For simplicity, at each period  only one worker is invited and
it is assume that the pool of outsiders always contains agents from the three types. Beviá, Corchón
and Romero (2016) studies the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) of this dynamic game where the
state at  is the number of insiders of each type at    1: Notice that at each period  ; the insiders
in    1 decide on the sharing rule as in Proposition 4. Thus, high productivity agents always
prefer the meritocratic sharing, low productivity agents always prefer the egalitarian sharing, and
for medium productivity agents will depend on her labor contribution compared with the average
contribution. Let  be the discount factor which indicates how much agents care about the future.
It is important for the analysis of the dynamic equilibrium to identify at each period which is
the dominant class. A group of a certain productivity is the dominant class at  if it represents
more than half of the population of insiders at    1: Note that if a group is dominant, decisions
are going to be chosen according to the preferences of this group. If there is no dominant group
at  , Beviá, Corchón and Romero (2016) show that, for a su¢ ciently large ; the decisive group
at  is the group of medium productivity agents. The main result in Beviá, Corchón and Romero
(2016) is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. (Beviá, Corchón and Romero (2016)). There exist  > 0 such that for all   ;
(i) In any MPE if H is the dominant class at period  , then H is dominant at all subsequent periods
and meritocracy will be the sharing rule.
(ii) In any MPE if M is the decisive group at period  ; then M will be the decisive type at any
subsequent period and eventually, egalitarianism will be the sharing rule.
(iii) In any MPE if L is the dominant class at period  ; then eventually egalitarianism will be the
sharing rule although they will eventually loose political power in favor of the medium class.
An important point of this analysis is that, when insiders take the decision on who to invite,
they have to take into account the consequences of this invitation in the future choices of the
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sharing rule. Clearly, if high types are the majority, the chosen sharing rule is the meritocratic one,
and they will keep the majority by inviting high types. Given the constant returns assumption
on the production function, they are indi¤erent among inviting agents from any type whenever
the meritocratic sharing rule is the outcome of the future organizations. But in this case, Beviá,
Corchón and Romero (2016) assume that ties are broken by choosing always the highest productivity
worker.16 If low types are the majority, the sharing rule will be the egalitarian one, and they want
to keep it this way in future organizations. Of course, they can do that by inviting only low types,
but, whenever they can guarantee that the egalitarian sharing rule is going to be the outcome,
they will prefer to increase total production. Thus why, at some point, they will prefer to give
the power to the medium class (provided that the medium class also prefer the egalitarian sharing
rule). Finally, if medium types are the decisive group, they will never hire low types, but they can
hire high types whenever they do not risk their decisive power. And output will be share eventually
in a egalitarian way.
Proposition 6 has important implications about the long run composition of a cooperative. In
particular, high quality organizations (those with a high type dominant class) tend to persist over
time. But organizations that are formed initially by other groups, never achieve full excellency.
Those results are formally summarized in the following Corollary where (mH ;m

M ;m

L) is the
proportion of insiders of type H;M and L respectively at time  .
Corollary 1. (Beviá, Corchón and Romero (2016)) For a  su¢ ciently close to 1 if the dominant
class at  = 0 isH; then lim!1(mH ;m

M ;m

L) = (1; 0; 0). In any other case lim!1(m

H ;m

M ;m

L) =
(0:5; 0:5; 0).
In this model, the long run behavior of organizations is totally determined by the initial con-
ditions and it is never a cooperative populated by low productivity workers only. But there are
models of dynamic organizations in which this conclusion does not hold. In Sobel (2001) stan-
dards of admission and the average quality of incumbents rise or fall without any bound (which is
impossible here because we only have three types). In Corchón (2005) there is free entry to the
cooperative. A boss for a single period is chosen randomly among the insiders. And who is the boss,
matters because a talented boss improves the productivity of all workers. In this model, the degree
16This is because under non constant returns, to introduce a high productivity worker would be preferrable. It is
only because the assumption of constant returns that indi¤erence among types arise.
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of meritocracy is the weight given by the lottery to choose a talented boss. A good boss may attract
many low productivity workers whose life is less miserable under an able command than under their
own. This is the Umbrella E¤ect that may help to explain why able bosses might be surrounded
by mediocre people, without assuming that able leaders do not like potential challengers around.
Thus the outcome of a policy of excellence in choosing leaders might be a cooperative populated
by low productivity workers. In this model, when the cooperative is not populated by identical
agents, the average productivity of the cooperative may cycle.
6. Dynamics. Meritocracy and Accumulation of Human Capital
The previous work studied how cooperatives may change due to the changes in the quantity of the
existing or the potential labor force. What about changes in the quality of actual workers? Beviá
and Corchón (2016) presented a dynamic model in which output is produced by human capital
which, in turn, is produced by inheritance (say, the cultural level of your family) and e¤ort (your
grades). Thus your e¤ort producing today human capital has long run e¤ects in subsequent periods.
The claim to output is not longer pure labor but human capital.
Formally, there are n families with a member alive in each period. At period t; and individual
from a family i receives the capital Ht 1i (accumulated by the previous generation) and has a labor
endowment ! > 1: Each individual produces her own capital from the inherited capital, Ht 1i and
her labor, lti 2 [0; !]; such that Hti = Ht 1i lti . Let Ht =
Pn
j=1H
t
j be the aggregate capital at period
t. At t = 0; H0i = H
0
j for all families i; j: At each period t;the consumption good is produced
using capital as input according to the production function X(Ht) = (Ht)r: The consumption of
an individual from a family i is given by
cti = (H
t)r


Hti
Ht
+
1  
n

;  2 [0; 1];
and her utility is represented by a Cobb-Douglas function of the form
Ui(c
t
i; !   lti) = ( + 1)(cti)

+1 (!   lti)
1
+1 ;  > 0:
In what follows we assume that n is large and when individuals take their decisions on her
labor contribution, they take Ht as given: We also assume that workers do not care about future
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generations. The maximization problem of worker i is
Max(cti;lti) Ui(c
t
i; !   lti)
s:t: cti = (H
t)r


Hti
Ht +
1 
n

lti 2 [0; !]
The solution to the above maximization problem is given by the rst order conditions, which
simplifying, can be written as
lti = !  

(Ht)1 r
Ht 1i

cti:
Given that all individuals are identical, in equilibrium Ht 1i = H
t 1
j ; H
t
i = H
t
j ; H
t 1 = nHt 1i ;
Ht = nHti : Thus, l
t
i = H
t
i=H
t 1
i = H
t=Ht 1; and cti = (H
t)=n, which implies that
Ht
Ht 1
=
!
1 + 
;
and the growth rate of human capital is
gt =
Ht  Ht 1
Ht 1
=
!
1 + 
  1:
The growth rate is constant, and it is positive i¤ (! 1) > 1. It increases with labor endowments
(so cooperatives rich in endowments grow faster than cooperatives poor in endowments); in the
taste of consumption (so consumerism is good for growth because incentives hard work) and the
degree of meritocracy (meritocracy encourages hard work).
Beviá and Corchón (2016) extend this model in two directions. Firstly, they show that with
a CES utility function the growth rate is no longer constant. In particular, if the elasticity of
substitution between consumption and labor is smaller than one, a stable steady state exist. The
capital at the steady state is increasing with the level of meritocracy. If consumption and leisure
are substitutes, capital at the steady state depends negatively on meritocracy and the taste of
consumption. This is because the steady state is unstable. Thus, given the initial stock of capital,
more meritocracy or more appreciation for consumption may impulse the economy from negative
to positive growth.
Secondly, keeping the Cobb-Douglas assumption, they introduce a concern for future genera-
tions. Each generation discount the welfare of the following generation by a factor of ; 2; ::: etc.
where  < 1: They show that for a su¢ ciently small ; there is a solution to the intertemporal
maximization problem in which the growth rate is constant and larger than the corresponding rate
23
in the zero discounting case. This is due to the fact that when future counts, there are more in-
centives to invest in capital which in turn stimulates growth. The role of meritocracy is identical
to the case  = 0. Meritocracy encourages work which produces human capital, which makes the
economy grow. For  > 0 returns to scale does play a role. The larger they are, the larger is the
growth rate. Finally they show that the optimal degree of meritocracy is reached, as in the cases
showed in Section 3, when r = .
7. Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that meritocracy is compatible with incentives and e¢ ciency only in the
case in which we can use the full force of implementation theory. But in presence of sabotage, this
compatibility is problematic. Egalitarianism is sabotage-free but may yield individual rationality
problems. And in contribution mechanisms, meritocracy must be tempered with egalitarianism
in shares that depend on the elasticity of output with respect to labor. Finally voting introduces
distortions because workers are prepared to vote ine¢ cient schemes that are stacked in their favour.
In our opinion, the theoretical work surveyed here present a basis to study how issues of meri-
tocracy, e¢ ciency, incentives and voting in cooperatives are coped with in the real world of coop-
eratives. And how the problems faced by cooperatives might be lessen by the theoretical insights
here presented.
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